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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
PAYTON HOLMES WASSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 47670-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-49822

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Payton Wasson contends the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction without a hearing in his case.

As such, this Court should vacate the order

relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Wasson, who was only

at the time, pied

guilty to one count of eluding and the State dismissed several other related charges. (R., p.60;
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Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), p.1.) 1 As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Wasson agreed
to pay restitution on all the dismissed charges. (R., pp.60-61.) The PSI noted that he expressed
remorse for his conduct, particularly when he learned that people had been injured as a result of
his actions. (PSI, pp.3-4.) This also constituted his first felony conviction. (See PSI, pp.5-7.) A
mental health examination concluded he suffered from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
and he reported that he had been in special education classes when he was in school. (PSI,
pp.11, 37.) The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one year
fixed, and suspended that sentence for a five-year period of probation. (R., pp.76-79.)
However, Mr. Wasson failed to check in with his probation officer and subsequently
admitted to absconding supervision.

(See R., pp.85-86, 121.) The district court decided to

revoke his probation and retain jurisdiction. (R., pp.123-25.)
When Mr. Wasson arrived at the rider program, the staff noted that he struggled with
reading, and he was assigned to read with a staff member in addition to his Thinking for a
Change (T4C) program. (See PSI, p.344.) After a month or so of this reading tutoring, he was
still "sound[ing] out the words and gets relatively close to what the words actually says [sic]."
(PSI, p.341.) A few weeks later, the program staff noted that he was making some progress in

the Thinking for a Change classes, and "no longer reads [his role plays] off a sheet of paper."
(PSI, p.341.) However, the staff noted he was still struggling with aspects of the Thinking for a

Change program. (PSI, p.341.) After a follow-up meeting with Mr. Wasson, the program staff
noted he "needs to be walked through the steps of the skill" in role play sessions and "[i]t takes
him a little longer to understand what the step is asking for." (PSI, p.340.) Despite his struggles,
he was still able to "complete[] most of the T4C program," though he was not successful at
1

To avoid confusion, citations to "PSI" are to the electronic document "Wasson 47670 psi," and
citations to "sealed" are to the electronic document "Wasson 47670 sealed."
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applying the program skills to real life. (PSI, p.339.) He also started to receive more-significant
disciplinary reports during that time. (See PSI, pp.333-34, 339-41.)
Based on his disciplinary issues and his struggles to apply the program concepts, the staff
decided to recommend Mr. Wasson for relinquishment. (PSI, pp.336, 338-39.) Mr. Wasson said
he ''understand[s] why I'm being linked." (PSI, p.336.) On the same day they decided on that
recommendation, some three months into the program, the staff also concluded, "Mr. Wasson
does qualify for special educational services." (PSI, p.338 (capitalization altered); compare also
PSI, p.11 (Mr. Wasson reporting that he had participated in special education classes due to his
struggles with reading); with PSI, p.10 (noting that his high school transcript did not show
special education classes during his time there).)
The district court relinquished jurisdiction without holding a hearing. (R., p.127; see
generally R.)

Mr. Wasson filed a notice of appeal timely from the order relinquishing

jurisdiction.

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Wasson
without a hearing because it failed to sufficiently consider the fact that Mr. Wasson was
approved for special education services the same day as relinquishment was recommended.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Wasson
Without A Hearing Because It Failed To Sufficiently Consider The Fact That Mr. Wasson Was
Approved For Special Education Services The Same Day As Relinquishment Was
Recommended
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,
438 (Ct. App. 2011). Such a decision will not be considered an abuse of discretion "if the trial
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court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate."

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).

"The purpose of retaining

jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of
the defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the
circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to
determine the course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of
society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. It is guided in this determination
byI.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.
In this regard, the need to protect society is the primary objective the court should
consider. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court
has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court should consider to
achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds
as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164 Idaho 204, 206

(Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a sentence of
incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of sentencing). In other
words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the goals of sentencing,
that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the other goals as being
insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006) (noting that the
failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in abuses of sentencing
discretion in several cases).
In this case, the district court relinquished jurisdiction with seven months remaining in
the period of retained jurisdiction. (See R., p.127 (the order relinquishing jurisdiction entered on
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November 27, 2019); Sealed, p.27 (letter of placement noting the district court's jurisdiction
would not end until July 8, 2020).) While it could properly consider Mr. Wasson's disciplinary
issues in making that decision, the decision to do so without sufficiently considering whether
Mr. Wasson was afforded a meaningful opportunity to complete the treatment program was still
an abuse of discretion because understanding Mr. Wasson's needs in that regard and how to
address them is critical to understanding whether he could be properly supervised on probation.
Of particular note in this case was the fact that Mr. Wasson was determined to be eligible
for special education services on the same day the staff decided to relinquish him. (PSI, p.338.)
That is important because the other reason for recommending relinquishment was Mr. Wasson's
struggles in the Thinking for a Change program, and his inability to apply the program lessons in
daily life. (PSI, p.336.) The record reveals the reason for that struggle was not a lack of desire
to internalize the program goals, but rather, was because it simply took him longer to read and
comprehend the program materials at the same pace as his classmates. (See PSI, pp.340-41
(noting that Mr. Wasson was able to make progress in the program, but that it was just taking
him "a little longer to understand what the step [in the program] is asking for").) After all, as his
reading tutor noted, Mr. Wasson was still having to sound out words as he read, and was still
struggling with those skills during the rider program. (PSI, p.341.) However, when he was
provided additional assistance, if he was walked through the steps of the skill," he could achieve
that required comprehension. (PSI, p.341.) This sort of assistance is precisely what special
education services are designed to provide - additional time and support resources to help a
person with these sorts of learning disabilities (and the associated behavioral issues) to be able to
access the program information and retain it.
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Therefore, the fact that the district court relinquished jurisdiction without allowing
Mr. Wasson to access the benefits of the special education services for which he qualified within
the period of retained jurisdiction constituted an abuse of its discretion. Cf State v. Dunnagan,
101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980) (holding the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by not
sufficiently considering the fact that the defendants were relatively young and had "very low" IQ
scores).

Without that opportunity, the district court did not have a complete picture of

Mr. Wasson's ability to be successful on probation, if provided the necessary supervision and
support. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's essentially-premature decision
to relinquish jurisdiction. See Lee, 117 Idaho at 205 (noting the purpose of retaining jurisdiction
after imposing a sentence is to "afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the
defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation").

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wasson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2020.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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